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Abstract
Morally injurious events have been shown to increase the likelihood of experiencing
anxiety, depressive, and posttraumatic stress symptoms of combat veterans. Research has
found that guilt and shame are associated with higher levels of symptomology following
morally injurious events. Similarly, individuals who are high in trait proneness to guilt
and shame may be at higher risk for developing symptoms following a morally injurious
event; however, no research to date has examined this possibility. In addition, acts that go
against what one considers morally right bring about cognitive dissonance which then
leads to anxiety. In order to reduce anxiety caused by this dissonance, one may disengage
from one’s moral beliefs. Thus, combat veterans who have experienced morally injurious
events may engage in moral disengagement in order to reduce the anxiety and distress
that follow this dissonance. The present study investigated the relationship between
morally injurious events and psychological outcomes and the role of proneness to guilt
and shame and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship between
these events and psychological outcomes in post-9/11 combat veterans. Exposure to
morally injurious events was significantly correlated with PTSD, depression, and anxiety.
Neither moral disengagement nor proneness to shame and guilt moderated the
relationship between exposure to morally injurious events and psychological outcomes.
Keywords: moral injury, moral disengagement, trauma, military, veterans
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Introduction
Research has indicated that many veterans of various armed conflicts, including
the most recent wars, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom,
experience mental health problems upon returning from combat, including posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. About 44% of combat veterans reported
that they experienced some problems adjusting after a deployment (Institute of Medicine
[IOM], 2014b). Incidences of psychological diagnoses, especially PTSD, have increased
substantially since the beginning of operations in the Middle East in 2001 (IOM, 2014b).
Veterans have also been found to experience moral injury (Shay, 1994), a distressing
biopsychosocial-spiritual reaction to experiences in combat that violate deeply held moral
beliefs (Litz et al., 2009; Shay, 2014). Exposure to morally injurious events (MIEs) has
been shown to be associated with anxiety (Nash et al., 2013), depression (Currier et al.,
2015; Yan, 2016), and posttraumatic stress (Nash et al., 2013; Yan, 2016).
Litz et al. (2009) proposed that anxiety comes about after MIE exposure through
the experience of shame and guilt. While shame and guilt could be conceptualized as
normal and prosocial reactions, these feelings may be dangerous when connected to
experiences in combat (Farnsworth et al., 2014), with the experience of shame and guilt
in veterans being associated with higher risk for suicidal ideation (Bryan et al., 2013).
While shame and guilt are outcome factors inherent in the moral injury model proposed
by Litz et al. (2009), proneness to shame and guilt as a personality construct may increase
risk of developing moral injury after exposure to MIEs, increasing the risk of developing
other mental health problems. Conversely, moral disengagement, the reappraisal of a
morally incongruous activity to avoid distressing affect and self-condemning cognitions,
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may reduce distress in response to a violation of what one considers morally right. The
present study examined the relationship between exposure to MIEs and anxiety,
depressive, and PTSD symptoms. In addition, it examined the moderating effect of
proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement in the relationship between MIEs
and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms.
The Military Experience
Combat Experience
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,
President George Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism, eventually resulting in the
United States (U.S.) occupation in Afghanistan, called Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), in October 2001 (Torreon, 2017). Following this came increased tension with
nation states that harbored terrorists and had the potential for nuclear warfare. This
tension resulted in conflict with Iraq, which led to a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, called
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in March 2003 (Torreon, 2017). These two operations
started a new era of combat by U.S. forces, and members of the U.S. military were
divided between deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq. In December 2014, combat
operations in Afghanistan stopped, marking the end of OEF and the beginning of
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) to rebuild and stabilize the government of
Afghanistan (Torreon, 2017). Likewise, the combat operations in Iraq came to a close in
December 2011, ushering in Operation New Dawn (OND) to stabilize and support the
government of Iraq (Torreon, 2017). With the start of new armed conflicts in two main
theatres of operations, with other operations throughout the globe, came an increase in
combat-related mental health issues.
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Prevalence of PTSD has risen in the veteran population since the beginning of the
post-9/11 wars. The IOM (2014a) reported that 9.2% of the entire living veteran
population has sought treatment for PTSD through the Department of Veterans Affairs
(DVA), with 24% of those veterans who sought treatment having served in Iraq or
Afghanistan. The IOM estimated that about 8% of all veterans and active duty service
members have been diagnosed with PTSD due to combat experience. PTSD is a stress
reaction from exposure to death, the threat of death or serious injury, or sexual violence,
resulting in intrusive thoughts, avoidance of stimuli, negative cognitions, and alterations
in arousal and reactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). PTSD has become
the more notable pathology affecting combat veterans, as it is the most researched and
most treated mental illness through the DVA (2017). The DVA also reported veterans’
use of DVA services for depressive disorders, neurotic disorder, affective psychoses,
drug and alcohol use disorders, sexual deviation disorders, and brain damage, with
depressive and neurotic disorders being the second and third most diagnosed.
Along with facing fears of death and injury caused by enemy combatants, service
members in combat must also face other challenges, including killing or injuring others.
It is hard to estimate how many enemy combatants were killed by U.S. forces throughout
the most recent wars, though some estimates exist. For example, Crawford (2015)
estimated that approximately 35,000 enemy combatants were killed in Afghanistan by
U.S. and allied forces from the beginning of the conflict until 2015. This estimate was
updated to about 42,000 in 2016, though Crawford (2016) speculated that this estimate
likely included civilian noncombatants also killed by U.S. and allied forces. Iraq Body
Count (2017) estimated that about 17,054 people (combatants, noncombatants, and
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civilians) were killed by U.S. forces in Iraq. Based on these numbers, it would be
estimated that about 59,000 enemy combatants were killed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan
and Iraq since the beginning of the two conflicts. Because this type of experience is not
seen in regular activities of life, adjustment to these experiences could bring about its
own mental health issues that would be rarely seen outside of the military experience.
Preparing for Combat
After World War II, and during the Korean War, S.L.A. Marshall (1947)
conducted a landmark study that looked at the firing rates of servicemembers in combat.
He found that they would choose to not fire at the enemy as a way of preserving what
they thought to be fundamentally right: not killing another person. His study consisted of
group interviews in which he would ask the servicemembers after a combat experience
about their firing rates. In a study conducted during the Vietnam War, Glenn (1987)
found similar results that some soldiers chose to not fire their weapons and most soldiers
reported at least once observing another soldier failing to fire while being engaged by the
enemy. Grossman (2009) explained that later studies found that some soldiers, pressured
to fire during engagements with the enemy, would fire over the heads of their enemy to
preserve their moral agency by not killing another person. These studies and anecdotal
evidence from three different wars demonstrate that servicemembers in combat still
struggle to go against what they see as morally right, even with training and justification.
When faced with a threat, the brain’s first reactions are either to fight, flee, or
freeze. Grossman (2009) explained that an additional option in a fight would be to
posture or submit. In combat, posturing would consist of making oneself seem as though
they are a threat and instill fear in the opposition. When choosing not to fire, one may be
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in a state of freeze, and when firing over the heads of the enemy, one may be in a state of
posture (Grossman, 2009). In an attempt change the results of the S.L.A. Marshall (1947)
study, the military changed some of the ways that servicemembers are trained to engage
the enemy (Grossman, 2009). During the time of S.L.A. Marshall, soldiers were trained
to fire using circle targets. After his results, the military found that they needed to train
their service members to engage people rather than circles, in hopes that they would be
desensitized to firing at another person. To do this, the military changed from circle
targets to targets shaped like people, which supposedly increased rates of fire and
enemies killed in action during the Vietnam War (Grossman, 2009).
What does not appear to have been examined at that time, however, was the moral
toll taken on the individual to be put into a position that goes against what they have
learned to be morally right. S.L.A. Marshall (1947) identified the reason that
servicemembers did not fire but did not examine the psychological consequences of
killing in combat. Training evolved because they were able to identify the reason for
nonaction during enemy engagement, introducing reflexive firing drills that rely on reflex
rather than appraisal (Grossman, 2009). Shay (1994) discovered that veterans returning
from Vietnam did not just suffer from PTSD from combat, but also had to make meaning
of their actions and the actions of others that they perceived as going against what is
morally right. While studies on World War II and the Korean War shed light on the
reason why they would not fire at others, leading to a shift in training, the Vietnam War
brought an increase in enemy engagement which allowed the use of this new training,
shedding light on the consequences of violating the morals they were originally trying to
protect by not firing.
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Military Orders
A unique factor of the military is the obligation to follow orders of those of higher
rank to the individual. When entering the military, individuals take an oath that includes
the line, “I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the
officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice” (Title 10, 2020). The oath reads that one must follow orders that are in
accordance with official regulation and legal guidelines according to the Uniformed Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ). This would also establish that orders must be legal and only
legal orders are to be followed, referred to as a Lawful Order (Joint Service Committee
on Military Justice, 2019). This may also mean that one must appraise the orders that are
given to ensure lawfulness while also appraising the morality involved in one’s actions.
With this, the instilled discipline of following orders combined with the fast pace of
combat may bring an individual to follow orders without appraisal of the legality or
morality that the orders may violate. This can bring challenges for the individual who
follows the order if the order is later appraised as being morally or legally wrong. Shay
(1994) noted that servicemembers, based on the above, must trust that their leadership are
providing orders that are legal and ethical and are following a moral code, as violations of
this could bring about psychological distress.
Moral Injury
The definition of moral injury has changed over time from Shay’s (1994) original
conceptualization of a psychological reaction to violations of “what is right” by the
individual’s leadership. Shay later refined his definition stating moral injury is present (1)
when “there has been a betrayal of what’s right (2) by someone who holds a legitimate
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authority (3) in a high stakes situation” (p. 183). Litz et al. (2009) expanded the definition
of moral injury as
the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social impact of
exposure to an act of transgression that severely and abruptly contradicts an
individual’s personal or shared expectation about the rules or the code of conduct,
either during the event or at some point afterwards. (p. 700)
This definition also added to the types of events that can be considered transgressive to
one’s morality as “an act of wrongdoing, failing to prevent serious unethical behavior, or
witnessing or learning about such an event” (p. 700), differing from Shay’s (1994, 2014)
definition that saw moral injury as only occurring when one’s morality is violated by a
person in power. Drescher et al. (2011), in a qualitative study with mental health
providers, added to the definition proposed by Litz et al. (2009) regarding the actions that
lead to a moral injury as those that are “inhumane, cruel, depraved, or violent, bringing
about pain, suffering, or death of others” (p. 9). Drescher et al. concluded that there are
problems with the definition, including problems of clarity and problems with the
definition being able to cover all that is included in a moral injury, based on clinician
reporting.
Stein et al. (2012), in a factor analysis of multiple types of military traumatic
events including morally injurious events, delineated two types: transgressions by self
and transgressions by others. Moral injury by self consists of transgressive acts of
commission or omission by the individual, while moral injury by others consists of
bearing witness or being the victim of a transgressive act committed by someone else.
However, when studying the psychometric properties of the Moral Injury Event Scale
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(MIES), Bryan et al. (2016) found that there are three factors involved in moral injury:
moral injury by self, moral injury by others, and moral injury by betrayal. While Stein et
al. (2012) included betrayal in moral injury by others, where the individual experiencing
the moral injury is the victim of a transgressive act, Bryan et al. (2013) identified betrayal
as a distinct category.
The definitions of moral injury historically failed to differentiate between the
actions from the outcome and mostly researched moral injury as being the act itself. In
past research, what was considered moral injury is actually the transgressive act or
morally injurious event (Farnsworth et al., 2017; Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016). Lancaster
and Erbes (2017) and Frankfurt and Frazier (2016), on the other hand, argued that the
psychological experience of these events should be included in the conceptualization of
moral injury and therefore proposed that the definition of a moral injury should include
both the perceived transgressive act as well as the associated psychological distress.
Lancaster and Erbes thus defined a moral injury as involving “the experience of one of
these events and then moral dissonance/conflict, which leads to negative emotions,
psychological symptoms, and maladaptive behaviors” (p. 317).
In sum, the construct of moral injury continues to evolve, and there has been some
disagreement as to whether it should be defined as the morally injurious event only and
what exactly constitutes such an event, or whether the resulting psychological distress
should be included in the definition. For clarity, I will refer to the term morally injurious
events as the main construct of interest for the present study, defined as acts of
commission or omission (i.e., not preventing an action) by self or other in combat that go
against one’s morality, as well as actions of the perceived abandonment or betrayal by
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other individuals or the institution that is conceived as being immoral and inconsistent
with moral beliefs learned through the military. Moral injury, then, is the overall
construct that consists of both a morally injurious event (transgressive act) and a
psychological reaction to that event (stimulus and response).
Table 1
Moral Injury Definitions
Stimulus a

Response

Factorsb

Reference

Acts of wrongdoing or failing
to prevent unethical behaviors

S, O, B

(Litz et al, 2009)

Betrayal of What is right by
leadership

B

(Shay, 2011)

Inhumane actions that bring
about pain and suffering

S, O

(Drescher et al.,
2011)

Committing, witnessing or
being a victim of an act that is
perceived to be a violation of
moral or ethical standards

S, O, B

(Stein et al., 2012)

S,O

(Currier et al.,
2015)

Witnessing/participating in
warzone acts that challenge
sense of humanity

Erosion of global meaning
systems

Acts of Omission, Commission
or betrayal that transgress
accepted behavioral
boundaries and norms.

Guilt and shame based syndrome S, O. B
consisting of PTSD symptoms,
demoralization, selfhandicapping, and self-injury

(Frankfurt et al.,
2017)

Transgressive act cited in
Frankfurt and Frazier (2016)

Negative emotions,
psychological symptoms,
maladaptive behavior

(Lancaster &
Erbes, 2017)

S, O, B

a. Morally Injurious Event/Transgressive act
b. Factors: self (S), other (O), betrayal (B)

Moral Development
To fully understand what constitutes moral injury, it is important to understand
moral development and how one comes to hold certain views on what is considered right.
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The understanding of what is right and what constitutes a moral action is developed
through life and is brought into the military by individual members. Kohlberg (2008)
identified three levels of moral development, with two types of value orientation in each
level. This model shows that a child learns morality through their interactions with
caregivers and moves from obedience of their caregivers’ rules to a more autonomous
understanding of what would be considered right and what would be considered wrong.
A child progresses through these levels from lower to higher levels of moral reasoning.
Once the higher level is achieved, moral decision making may be situationally based, but
higher levels of reasoning are maintained through life (Kohlberg, 1975). This means that,
though an individual may make a “poor” moral decision in life based on circumstances,
one’s higher-level thoughts, with regards to moral decision making, are still intact.
Kohlberg (1975, 2008) developed his model based on cognitive development, though he
pointed out that intelligence is not correlated to moral reasoning.
Morality in the Military
The construct of morality within the military and in war may seem to differ from
the construct outside of the military. Outside of the military and outside of combat, taking
another life may be seen as immoral, whereas in military combat, taking a life can be
seen as justified and necessary. However, there are instances in war where taking a life
can no longer be considered moral, such as going against the established laws that govern
combat (established by the military service, the government, and international law).
The military itself has its own moral code that is expected to be adhered to by those who
serve (Shay, 1994). Within that moral code is duty and service, which members of the
military are expected to hold first above everything else (Cook, 2000). Duty and service

12
is the obligation to one’s comrades as well as the obligation to fulfill one’s
responsibilities.
Leadership is expected to protect their subordinates and adhere to their own moral
code while in combat (Shay, 1994). Shay (1994) also explained that fairness in combat
includes protecting subordinates. Fairness, in this sense is ensuring that the distribution of
exposure to combat is even among those in the unit, such that each member of the unit is
guaranteed to be equally exposed to combat, rather than shielding a select few. Fairness,
in this case, becomes a part of the distinct moral code within the military.
Individual and Collective Morality
As stated, an individual develops a sense of moral agency throughout life. They
also learn to adapt to the moral beliefs of the military upon entry. Both of these sets of
moral beliefs can come into conflict when in combat. Killing an enemy combatant can
come into conflict with a moral belief that killing another person is wrong, even though it
may be seen as acceptable and necessary within the context of combat. Cook (2000)
explained that there is a tension between higher moral codes (moral codes that are seen as
derived from a religious code) that service members bring into the military and the
military moral code. Service members are expected to follow specific laws of war that
govern when killing is acceptable. This, in turn, is its own moral code with expected
adherence with exemptions for when killing is considered morally acceptable.
Shay’s (1994) original definition of moral injury emphasized that a moral injury
could only come about when leadership betrays the individual. This definition views the
betrayal as transgressing moral beliefs and as contradicting what one considers to be right
based on military moral code which emphasizes loyalty among comrades. This definition,
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however, does not cover the possible transgression of moral beliefs that one may
encounter in combat because individuals enter the military with an already developed
sense of morality. Later models take this into consideration and define the possible
transgressive act as acts of omission or commission by the individual that go against their
already developed moral agency as well as what was developed within the military
context. In betrayal, the leadership violates what one considers morally right against the
individual (Shay, 1994) where in moral injury by self, the individual acts in ways that
transgress moral beliefs.
Battles et al. (2018) found that betrayal by leadership was associated with
depression, PTSD symptoms, anxiety, and hazardous alcohol use. They hypothesized that
the betrayal by leadership damaged their sense of membership within the organization,
potentially bringing about psychological distress. They also found that both betrayal and
exposure to atrocities had the most significant association with PTSD, depressive, and
anxiety symptoms. Evans et al. (2018) proposed that when one is deeply aware of and
connected to their personal values, they may experience relatively higher life satisfaction
despite distress following exposure to moral violations by self than following moral
violations by others. This may explain why those with greater exposure to morally
injurious events by others and through betrayal showed in increase level of distress
(Battles et al., 2018) and reported less life satisfaction (Evans et al., 2018).
Cook (2000) and Shay (1994) both looked at the justification for the wars that are
fought. A war that has no apparent reason would bring about feelings of violation of
those morals. This is similar to what was found by Gibbons et al. (2013), where service-
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members in Iraq could not find meaning in the conflict, and this caused tension with their
own morality.
The conflict between the core morals of the individual service members and the
morals of the military brings about some confusion as to what could cause a moral injury,
with some seeing moral injury as only arising from the violation of moral codes in the
context of the military (going only against the military moral code) and some seeing it as
a violation of either the military moral code or the moral code that was brought in from
development (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016; Litz, 2009). It would appear, based on the
above, that there are two separate moral codes, one of the military and one that is brought
by the individual from their own development, which could bring about tension while
serving in combat.
Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s cognitions and beliefs do not match
one’s actions. The result of dissonance is psychological discomfort motivating the
individual to reduce dissonance through either avoidance of conflicting
information/actions or through modifying cognitions in order to match actions or
information that conflicts with beliefs (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019). This could be
extended to holding moral beliefs and acting in a way that goes against those beliefs,
resulting in cognitive dissonance. When one is not able to reduce the dissonance, this
would result in distress.
One way that cognitive dissonance can be reduced is through reappraisal of
actions or beliefs to remove the inconsistency (Freiman, 2010). This could be done
through justification of actions both while they are occurring or after the fact (Freiman,
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2010). Reappraisal of one’s actions in order to justify going against cognitions and beliefs
can reduce distress, referred to as moral disengagement.
Moral Disengagement
Because the violation of one’s morality is hypothesized to result in psychological
distress, it would follow that any action in combat that violates one’s moral beliefs would
result in psychological distress. As this is not always the case and psychological reactions
to actions in combat do not occur in every combat veteran, protective factors may buffer
the reaction to going against established moral beliefs. In order to protect oneself from
the self-condemnation of going against one’s own morality, Bandura (1999) proposed
that people are able to disengage from their moral beliefs. To avoid self-censure, an
individual is able to disengage from controls that regulate behavior that typically are
guided by moral views by disengaging from their moral beliefs. Typically, when a person
goes against what is right, in a moral sense, they then face the uncomfortable and
distressing feeling of self-censure or self-devaluation (Bandura, 1999). In other words,
they feel guilt or shame for violating what they consider to be morally right. In order to
disengage from beliefs about what they consider to be right, to avoid that discomfort and
distress, they must justify their actions, devalue or dehumanize the victims of their
actions, minimize or ignore the consequences, justify why their actions were necessary,
or displace the responsibility for their actions (Bandura, 1999). These forms of moral
disengagement will be described in detail in this section.
Because higher level of thought regarding personal morality is still intact even
after situationally going against one’s moral conviction (Kohlberg, 1975), one must
appraise what has been done. In that period, justification of what has been done, like
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identifying it as a “worthy” or just cause, can prevent feelings of self-censure for personal
actions (Bandura, 1999). In this case, the individual would need to see their actions in
combat as being justified in order to meet the greater good. For example, the service
members may rely on the justification for the war in which they are fighting, which
would, as stated before, rely on their identification with the reason for entering the
conflict. If meaning can be made regarding the actions and the individual identifies with
the justification of the conflict, they may be able to protect themselves from the
psychological distress that could result.
Bandura (1999) has examined the language used within a conflict. In order to
engage in behavior that is in violation of personally held beliefs, one may use words for
one’s actions that take away the emotional impact of the actions. Rather than killing in
combat, one may refer to one’s actions as “eliminating the enemy.” Language is thought
to shape thought patterns, which make actions appear different to the individual
(Bandura, 2002). This process is referred to as sanitizing language or euphemistic
language. In sanitizing the language, the individual can also turn a violent activity, or one
that violates their morality, into a socially positive action (Bandura, 2002).
Displacement of responsibility is placing the responsibility of one’s actions onto
another. A service member, rather than seeing themselves being in violation of their own
morality by killing in combat, may view themselves as mere followers of orders that have
been given. This takes the responsibility off themselves (Bandura, 1999). Being ordered
to commit atrocities, however, has been seen to bring about psychological distress in
veterans, due to a feeling of betrayal by the authority (Shay, 1994). Though the
subordinates can displace the responsibility of their actions onto the leaders that gave
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orders, there may still be a reaction due to the perceived betrayal. Bandura (1999)
explained that it takes true belief in the purpose of the institution, and the leadership
therein, to be able to carry out ordered acts and displace this type of responsibility.
Another means of moral disengagement is when a whole group is participating in
an action, and therefore there is no personal responsibility that must be taken for the
actions through diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, 1999). In a military context, actions
in combat would be seen as the responsibility of the entire unit rather than an individual’s
responsibility.
Finally, dehumanizing the enemy takes the humane qualities away from the
victim of one’s actions, making it easier to commit those actions (Bandura, 1999). In
combat, viewing the enemy as though they are not human makes it easier to kill because
one’s morality that would view killing a human as wrong is not violated. Dehumanizing
terms have been used to equate the enemy to being less than human to make it easier to
kill in combat. Nations and armies often make their enemy appear as less than human or
even demonized in order to make it easier for the soldiers kill in combat because they are
less likely to value the lives of the enemy (Bandura, 1999).
Bandura (1999) has shown that government and agencies have used moral
disengagement, either wittingly or unwittingly, to bring their actors to act in ways that
violate held moral beliefs for the benefit of the agency. This is a malicious way in which
moral disengagement has been applied in society. This may make it appear as though
moral disengagement is inherently detrimental to society. This, however, negates the idea
that moral disengagement may have utility in lives that are not intentionally malicious. It
may be that, as a society, morality is held to be such an important aspect of society and
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disengagement from morals is seen as inherently antisocial. Shame and guilt following
moral transgression is then seen as the primary prosocial reaction.
In combat, soldiers are expected to act in ways that may, outside the context of
military action, be viewed as transgressions of morality. This may include killing in
combat. Though it may be justified in this context, the consequences of violating one’s
morality may cause psychological distress, referred to as moral injury (Litz et al., 2009).
To protect against the distress caused by such violations, the individual may morally
disengage in order to protect themselves (Farnsworth et al., 2014). There is evidence that
suggest that when this does not occur the soldier may experience distress. In fact, most
soldiers will consciously or unconsciously choose inaction in combat rather than
transgressing their moral beliefs (Grossman, 2009).
Moral disengagement is used to reappraise actions committed by the individual in
order to avoid feelings of discomfort associated with the action (Bandura, 1999). Shame
and guilt are feelings of discomfort, but are seen as prosocial responses to going against
what one learns as socially appropriate behavior (Young et al., 2016). Individuals learn
through their development what is considered morally right and also learn to feel guilty if
they go against what is considered right and are socialized to learn that doing wrong
means that they are wrong, leading to feelings of shame (Kohlerg, 1975; Young et al.,
2016). Moral disengagement, then, is going against the social constraints of what one
learns is right.
Though it is often employed by the individual to avoid the discomfort of going
against their moral beliefs in small ways, it can also have serious consequences to
society. Bandura (1999), for instance, looked at how this led to atrocities being
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committed and how governments used this appraisal in order to convince the people to
disregard their moral beliefs. A problem with researching this phenomenon on such a
large scale is that the events that incorporate moral disengagement are typically so large
and so egregious that it becomes hard to research. It would also be difficult for some
researchers to place their own values aside to research the phenomenon without bias.
Likewise, cultural factors are not typically considered when it comes to researching this
phenomenon.
To minimize the uncomfortable feelings of self-censure from going against what
one sees as morally wrong, one is able to disengage from one’s moral beliefs and
participate in morally incongruous activities by dehumanizing one’s victims, minimizing
or ignoring the consequences, justifying one’s actions, or displacing the responsibility.
Moral disengagement minimizes the discomfort one may feel after having gone against
one’s own moral beliefs.
Shame and Guilt
Shame can be defined as a feeling that there is something dishonorable in how a
person acted in a particular circumstance (American Psychological Association, 2009).
Similarly, guilt can be defined as distress over feeling that one has done something wrong
(American Psychological Association, 2009). It would appear that these two definitions
revolve around the concept of feelings relating to a past action. Because of their
similarity, guilt and shame are typically combined in the literature as a single concept.
Even as a combined definition of unpleasant feelings that one has done something wrong
or dishonorable would match the subjective experience of a moral injury where the
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individual feels unpleasantness resulting from past actions that could be deemed wrong or
dishonorable.
Guilt could be conceptualized as a prosocial response to tension in one’s past, but
in military and combat veteran populations, guilt has been associated with poorer mental
health outcomes (Farnsworth et al., 2014). Bryan et al. (2013) found that guilt and shame
were higher for combat veterans who had a past history of suicidal ideations. The severity
of suicidal ideations was correlated with ratings of guilt and shame independently.
Kausch and Marks (2013) found in a case that some veterans’ guilt regarding their past
actions in combat could also lead to a greater reaction to other instances of violence like
news of a mass shooting. They found that veterans’ resonated more with these instances
because of their own past moral transgressions. This would mean that guilt from a moral
injury could have lingering effects that could also increase suffering related to moral
injury (Kausch & Marks, 2013). This would make guilt associated with combat
experience even more dangerous, as conceptualized by Farnsworth et al. (2014).
Litz et al. (2009) proposed that guilt and shame would follow a morally injurious
event. Frankfurt et al. (2017) found that guilt was significantly associated with
transgressive acts, with the most reported transgressive act being killing in combat. They
also found that guilt was a significant pathway between transgressive acts and suicidality.
Lancaster (2017) found that state guilt and shame was a mediator between morally
injurious events and PTSD and depressive symptoms.
Yan (2016) found evidence that failure to integrate traumatic experiences with
service-member’s moral framework led to poorer mental health outcomes. This failure to
integrate may be due to guilt and shame related to that traumatic experience and not
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allowing the veteran to forgive themselves. Litz et al. (2009) proposed that the failure to
integrate morally injurious experiences with morals brings about feelings of guilt and
shame over one’s actions, or lack thereof.
Proneness to guilt and shame is a trait that may make an individual more likely to
experience guilt and shame after a dissonance provoking event (Cohen et al., 2011).
Cohen et al. (2011) described shame and guilt as moral emotions that occur after a
transgression. The proneness to shame and guilt is the propensity one holds to experience
such emotions after a transgression.
Litz et al. (2009) theorized that proneness to shame, being prone to view oneself
as dishonorable for one’s actions, is a risk factor for psychological distress associated
with a moral injury. Fergus et al. (2010) found that proneness to guilt and shame were
predictors of symptom expression for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and social
anxiety disorder (SAD) in a nonveteran sample. Young et al. (2016) found that proneness
to shame and guilt was associated with development of depression based on situational
factors. This would mean that a higher proneness to shame and guilt would influence the
distress experienced when faced with life stressors. The proneness to shame and guilt
then leads to the experience of shame and guilt following a morally injurious event which
may lead to an inability to forgive oneself for what occurred and therefore greater
distress. No studies have been published to date examining whether proneness to shame
and guilt affects the relationship between morally injurious events and psychological
outcomes.
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Moral Injury and Mental Health
PTSD and Depression
Studies have investigated the association between moral injury and mental health
outcomes, specifically depression and PTSD (Currier et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013; Yan,
2016). Currier et al. (2015) found a positive correlation between moral injury as
determined by the Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIS-Q) and PTSD (r
= .376) and depressive symptoms (r = .306, n = 131). Nash et al. (2013) found a positive
correlation between moral injury and PTSD symptoms (r = .28) and depressive
symptoms (r = .40, n = 533). Evans et al. (2017) found a correlation between moral
injury and PTSD (r = 206) and depression (r = .125, n = 200), and Lancaster (2017)
found a positive correlation between moral injury and depression (r = .33) and PTSD (r =
.53, n = 161). The three latter studies utilized the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES).
Likewise, Yan (2016) found a significant association between morally injurious events
and both depressive symptoms and PTSD symptoms, and found that PTSD and
depression symptoms are affected by moral injury.
A morally injurious event may fall into what is considered a Criterion A event
when it threatens the individual’s life or serious injury, when they observe someone being
killed or seriously injured, or when they learn of someone close to them being killed or
seriously injured (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Because many forms of
morally injurious events include some sort of Criterion A event, it would follow that
PTSD would also affect the individual. When the criteria for PTSD are met and the
Criterion A event is one that deeply transgresses what one considers to be morally right,
the individual may be considered having moral injury based PTSD (Held et al., 2017).
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Though there is a correlation between moral injury and PTSD, the correlation is
based on the correlation between experiencing a morally injurious event and the
experience of PTSD after the event. It is likely that, like PTSD, there are those who do
not experience psychological distress following the traumatic event, to the extent of
PTSD, or who were able to recover from the traumatic experience. Also, the measures
used only measured the extent to which one has experienced a morally injurious event,
essentially only measuring Criterion A events when comparing it to the commonly used
measures of PTSD.
Battles at al. (2018) found that, though moral injury mediated the relationship
between morally injurious events and PTSD symptoms, moral injury was not found to be
directly associated to poorer mental health outcomes, though PTSD was. They viewed
moral injury as being completely separate from PTSD, though it mediated the
relationship.
Table 2
PTSD and Moral Injury Correlations
PTSD
MI Scale Scale

r

n

Reference

MIES

PCL-S

.28

2610

(Nash et al., 2013)

MIS-Q

PCL-C .376

131

(Currier et al., 2015)

MIES

PCL-C .206

200

(Evans et al., 2017)

MIES

PCL-5

.53

161

(Lancaster, 2017)

MISS-M PCL-5

.56

427

(Koenig, 2018)

MIQ-M

.72

244

(Battles et al., 2018)

PCL-5

24
Anxiety
Litz et al. (2009) hypothesized that a morally injurious event can lead to anxiety.
Few studies, however, have looked at a direct correlation between anxiety and moral
injury. Nash et al. (2013) found a positive correlation (r = 0.28, n = 533) between anxiety
and moral injury and Evans et al. (2017) found similar results in a smaller sample (r =
.221, n = 200). Evans et al. found that greater exposure to potentially morally injurious
events, as measured by the Moral Injury Events Scale, was associated with increased
anxiety (p < .001, n = 200). Litz et al. theorized that rumination of the morally injurious
experience leads to anxiety via shame and guilt, though no studies have directly
investigated rumination in this context.
Summary, Aims, and Hypotheses
Self-reported morally injurious experiences by combat veterans have been
associated with PTSD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms. Morally injurious events have
also been associated with feelings of guilt and shame, while proneness to guilt and shame
as a trait has been theorized to exacerbate the effects of these events on psychological
distress (Litz et al., 2009). On the other hand, moral disengagement may serve as a
protective factor from experiencing the distress associated with morally injurious events.
While this makes sense from a conceptual standpoint, this has not yet been examined in
empirical research.
The aim of this research was to investigate the relationship between morally
injurious events and psychological outcomes and the role of proneness to guilt and shame
and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship between morally
injurious events and psychological outcomes in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF; Iraq)/

25
Operation New Dawn (OND; Iraq)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF;
Afghanistan)/Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS; Afghanistan) Combat Veterans. It was
hypothesized that morally injurious events would be associated with increased levels of
anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to guilt and shame was
hypothesized to be a moderator between morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive,
and PTSD symptoms such that those participants with high morally injurious events and
higher proneness to guilt and shame were predicted to have the highest levels of anxiety,
depressive, and PTSD symptoms, followed by those with high morally injurious events
and low proneness to guilt and shame, while those with low morally injurious events
were predicted to have the lowest levels of anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms,
regardless of proneness to shame and guilt. Moral disengagement was hypothesized to
buffer the association between morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and
PTSD symptoms such that those with high morally injurious events and high moral
disengagement would report lower anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms than those
with low moral disengagement and high morally injurious events, while those with low
morally injurious events would report lower anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms,
regardless of moral disengagement.
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Methods
Participants
Based on a power analysis using a power of .80 and α = .05, and a medium effect
size for a multiple regression analysis, a minimum of 76 participants were required and
89 participants were recruited. Participants were included if they were post-9/11 combat
veterans who have deployed to a combat zone between September 2011 and present.
Participants were excluded if they are currently on active duty or are in transition from
active duty. Twelve participants did not fully complete the survey, and no participants
met exclusion criteria, resulting in a total of 77 participants.
Measures
Background Questionnaire
The participants completed a questionnaire to gather information on
race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, employment, and highest level of education.
Additionally, information on length of service, number of deployments, location and
approximate dates of deployments, branch of service, current service status, and type of
discharge were collected to ensure inclusion criteria were met. Participants were also
asked if they are currently taking psychotropic medication, if they are currently attending
psychotherapy, and the last time they attended psychotherapy.
Moral Injury
The Moral Injury Event Scale (MIES) is comprised of nine questions divided into
two factors, with the first factor measuring perceived transgressions committed by the
individual or others and the second factor measuring perceived betrayal (Nash et al.,
2013). This provided data on transgressive acts of betrayal by the leadership as proposed
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by Shay (1994) as well as data on individual commission or omission of wartime acts in
accordance with the model proposed by Litz et al. (2009). The measure uses a 6-point
Likert scale (1–Strongly agree, 2–Moderately agree, 3–Slightly agree, 4–Slightly
disagree, 5–Moderately agree, 6–Strongly disagree). Respondents used this scale to
identify agreement with statements made about their experiences in combat. Nash et al.
(2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for the entire measure (N = 1,039), indicating
good internal consistency reliability for the original 11-item scale and a Cronbach’s alpha
of .90 when only the first nine questions were used. Because of the increased reliability
for the nine-item assessment, the last two questions were removed for the purpose of this
study, as recommended by Nash et al. (2013). Bryan et al. (2016) divided the scale into
three factors—moral injury by self, moral injury by others, and moral injury by
betrayal—with good internal reliability in two samples (N = 151 and 935). They reported
a Cronbach’s alpha of .96 and .94 for moral injury by self (Questions 3-6), .79 in both
samples for moral injury by others (Questions 1 and 2), and .83 and .89 for moral injury
by betrayal (Questions 7-9).
Moral Disengagement
The Moral Disengagement Scale introduced by Jackson and Sparr (2005) is an
eight-item assessment that measures the moral disengagement factors proposed by
Bandura (1999), with one question for each factor (1–euphemistic labeling, 2–moral
justification, 3–dehumanization, 4–diffusion of responsibility, 5–minimizing
consequences, 6–displacement of responsibility, 7–palliative comparison, 8–attribution of
blame; Jackson & Sparr, 2005). The measurement uses a 5-point Likert scale (1–Not true,
2–A little true, 3–Middling true, 4–Quite true, 5–Very true) and respondents rate their
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agreement with the given statement. Jackson and Sparr (2005) reported a Cronbach’s
alpha of .86 for the assessment in one study and .81 for their second study, indicating
good internal reliability. This assessment was chosen over other possibilities because of
its direct relation to military activity such that it focuses on counterterrorism and
necessity of force from military. It was also chosen because it was normed in an adult
population and has good internal reliability. One problem with this specific assessment
was that it was normed in an Austrian population. The measure was translated by Jackson
and Sparr, but the psychometric properties of the English version are unknown.
Anxiety
The Patient Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS) –
Emotional Distress – Anxiety Short Form version 1.0 is an eight-item assessment of
anxiety symptoms that have been experienced within the past 7 days. The measure uses a
5-point Likert scale where the respondent rates the frequency of symptoms, from “never”
to “always.” The PROMIS anxiety short form has good reliability with a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.968 for ages 21 through 49 and 0.971 for those age 50 through 64 in a diverse
population (N = 10,740; Teresi et al., 2016a). This assessment was chosen because of its
validity and reliability and because it was validated in paper form as well as
electronically. Validation of the digital version of this assessment showed no differences
in validity or reliability from the paper version (Bjorner et al., 2014). This makes it
possible to convert the assessment into an online assessment without jeopardizing the
validity of the assessment.
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Depression
The (PROMIS) – Emotional Distress – Depression Short Form version 1.0 is an
eight-item assessment of depressive symptoms that have been experienced within the past
7 days. The measure uses a 5-point Likert scale where the respondent rates the frequency
of symptoms, from “never” to “always.” The PROMIS depression short form has good
reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.969 for ages 21 through 49 and 0.969 for those
age 50 through 64 in a diverse population (N = 5,000; Teresi et al., 2016b). This
assessment was chosen because of its validity and reliability and because it was validated
in paper form as well as electronically. Validation of the digital version of this
assessment showed no differences in validity or reliability from the paper version
(Bjorner et al., 2014). This makes it possible to convert the assessment into an online
assessment without jeopardizing the validity of the assessment.
Proneness to Shame and Guilt
The Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) scale was used to measure the proneness
to experiencing guilt and shame. In this measure, there are two indices, one for guilt and
one for shame. The GASP is a 16-question, situationally-based scale that measures one’s
propensity to feel guilt and shame in response to provided scenarios (Cohen et al., 2011).
The measurement uses a 7-point Likert scale to rate the likeliness of their response to the
given scenario (1–Very unlikely, 2–Unlikely, 3–Slightly likely, 4–About 50% likely, 5–
Slightly likely, 6–Likely, 7–Very likely). The GASP scale has an alpha coefficient of .60,
indicating acceptable reliability.
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PTSD Checklist – Military Version
The PTSD Checklist – Military Version (PCL-M) was used to measure PTSD
symptoms. The PCL-M is a 17-question, symptom-focused measure that uses a 5-point
Likert scale to rate the severity of the symptoms. This scale was chosen over other PTSD
scales because it has fewer questions on the measure and its validity and reliability in
measuring PTSD symptoms. The PCL-M demonstrated good convergent validity when
compared to similar measures of PTSD and had an internal consistency coefficient alpha
of .96 for the full scale (Keen et al., 2008). The PCL-M was also found to have good
diagnostic value for PTSD (Keen et al., 2008).
Combat Exposure
The Combat Exposure Scale (CES) was used to measure the amount to which the
participant has experienced combat situations. The CES is a seven-question assessment
that uses a 5-point Likert scale to rate the extent to which one was exposed to combat.
Questions 1 and 5–7 are rated based on the amount of times the participant was exposed
(1–None/Never, 5–51+ Times), Question 2 is rated based on the number of months one
was exposed, and Question 4 is based on the percentage of time one was exposed. The
CES has a coefficient alpha of .85 and a test–retest reliability of .97 for a 1-week retest,
both indicating good reliability for this measure (Keane et al., 1989).
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Table 3
Measures

Construct

Scale

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Reference

Morally Injurious
Events (Overall)

Moral Injury Event Scale
(MIES)

.90

(Nash et al., 2013)

Moral Injury from
Self

Moral Injury Event Scale
(MIES) Factor 1 (Questions
3–6)

.94

(Bryan et al., 2016)

Moral Injury from
Other

MIES Factor 2 (Questions 1–
2)

.79

(Bryan et al., 2016)

Moral Injury from
Betrayal

MIES Factor 3 (Questions 7–
9)

.89

(Bryan et al., 2016)

Anxiety

PROMIS Emotional Distress
– Anxiety – Short Form 8a

.968

(Teresi et al., 2016a)

Depression

PROMIS Emotional Distress
– Depression – Short Form 8a

.969

(Teresi et al., 2016b)

.86

(Jackson & Sparr,
2005)

Moral Disengagement Moral Disengagement Scale
PTSD

PTSD Checklist – Military
Version (PCL-M)

Proneness to Shame
and Guilt

Guilt and Shame Proneness
(GASP)

.60

(Cohen et al., 2011)

Combat Exposure

Combat Exposure Scale

.85

(Keane et al., 1989)

Procedure
Participants were recruited online to take a survey. The measurements were
converted into an online survey through surveymonkey.com. Recruitment was conducted
through online communities for veterans and through Facebook posts. The survey was
presented as a study looking at the respondent’s reactions to actions in combat, taking
approximately 30 min to complete.
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The survey began with an informed consent that stated that the title of the
research was Predictors of Psychological Distress Following Experiences in Combat.
The title was changed to mask the main study hypothesis and to reduce demand
characteristics. The participants were then asked to take a survey that would be used to
verify their veteran status. The survey consisted of three questions used by Lancaster and
Erbes (2017). The participants needed to either correctly answer the questions provided
or indicate that they are not a veteran. Indicating that they are not a veteran discontinued
the survey. Correctly answering the questions verified veteran status. The measure was
then presented in the following order: the demographics questionnaire, the PROMIS
anxiety measurement, PROMIS depression measurement, PCL-M, the MIES, the Moral
Disengagement Scale, and then the GASP. There were a total of 58 questions for this
study. After the participants submitted their responses, they were taken to a document
that they could download which provided information regarding national and local
services for veterans. The service referrals were focused on services that help veterans
with combat-related trauma. A list of 24-hr crisis and suicide lines was also provided.
Statistical Analysis
SPSS was used for statistical analysis. Distribution of all variables examined
normality and outliers. A zero-order correlation table was then created for all main study
variables (Table 3). A Pearson r correlation was conducted to correlate the level of moral
injury, as reported in the MIES to anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms to test the
first hypothesis that moral injury is associated with increased anxiety, depressive, and
PTSD symptoms.
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To test the second hypothesis that proneness to shame and guilt will be a
moderator between morally injurious experiences and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD
symptoms, a multiple regression analysis was used. Proneness to shame and guilt and
moral injury scores were entered in Step 1, followed by their cross product in Step 2, and
anxiety, depression, and PTSD scores were entered as the dependent variables. To test the
third hypothesis that moral disengagement buffers the relationship between morally
injurious and anxiety, depressive and PTSD symptoms were tested using a multiple
regression. Moral disengagement and moral injury were entered in Step 1, followed by
the cross product in Step 2, and anxiety, depression, and PTSD were entered at the
dependent variables.
It was expected that proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement
would moderate the relationship between moral injury and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD
symptoms, with higher moral disengagement leading to lower anxiety, depression, and
PTSD when moral injury is elevated and higher proneness to guilt and shame leading to
higher anxiety, depression, and PTSD when moral injury is elevated. It was anticipated
that proneness to shame and guilt and moral disengagement would be negatively
correlated. Simple effects examined the nature of the interaction.
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Results
Sample Characteristics
A total of 77 post-9/11 veterans completed the survey, 67.5% of whom identified
as male and 28.8% of whom identified as female. This is an oversampling of females as
the estimated percentage of the military is 15% female (ODASoD, 2014). This sample
consisted of 16.3% African Americans, 10% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10% Hispanic/Latino
(a/x), and 60% White. The mean age of this sample was 31 years and the mean total
combat deployed months 18.5. This sample consisted of 34% Army, 21.3% Navy, 21.3%
Air Force, and 11.3% Marines.
A zero-order correlation was completed using a Pearson-r two-tailed correlation
to examine the connection between each of the main study variables measured (Table 4).
Table 4
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations for All Measures
4

5

6

7

8

1

28.6(12.4)

-

2. MI-Self

8.5 (2.7)

.725**

-

3. MI- Other

11.3(7.9)

.942**

.620**

4. MI- Betrayal

8.9(3.6)

.812**

.493** .659**

5. Moral
Disengagement

25.2(11.4)

-.264*

-.272* -.288* -.207

74.9(8)

.095

7. Anxiety

18.9(10.7)

.383**

.234* .427** .286* -.665** .009

8. Depression

18.8(10.7)

.298**

.182

.332** .235* -.657** .004 .948

9. PTSD

47.6(10.7)

.365**

.203

.402** .279* -.612** -.012 .931 .892

10. CES

16(4.3)

.513**

6. GASP

2

3

M (SD)
1. Total MI

.047

9

10

-

.144

-

.042

.027

-

.318** .327** .201* .245* .032* .743**.683**.786** -

MI=Moral Injury, scores from MIES (MI-Self=acts of commission or omission; MI-Other=Observing the act; MI-Betrayal=betrayal by the
institution that goes against moral beliefs); CES=Combat Event Scale; GASP=Guilt and Shame Proneness; PTSD=Posttraumatic Stress disorder,
scores from PTSD Checklist-5.
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level
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MIES and Psychological Outcomes
Overall reporting of morally injurious events was positively correlated with
anxiety (r = 0.388, p=0.001), depression (r = .298, p = 0.008), and PTSD (r = 0.368, p =
0.001). Moral injury–self was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.243, p = 0.033)
but no significant correlation was found between moral injury–self and depression and
PTSD outcomes. Moral injury–others was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.427, p
= 0.000), depression (r = 0.332, p = 0.003), and PTSD (r = 0.402, p = 0.000). Likewise,
moral injury–betrayal was positively correlated with anxiety (r = 0.286, p = 0.012),
depression (r = 0.235, p = 0.040), and PTSD (r = 0.279, p = 0.014). Moral injury–others
showed the strongest correlation with negative psychological outcomes, with the weakest
correlation between moral injury-self and negative outcomes. Overall, MIES was found
to be positively correlated with each negative psychological outcome, supporting the first
hypothesis that there is a correlation between MIES reporting and negative psychological
outcomes. Interestingly, anxiety was found to be the only psychological outcome that was
significantly correlated with each MIES factor.
Shame and Guilt Proneness as a Moderator
Proneness to guilt and shame was hypothesized to be a moderator between
morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to
shame and guilt did not moderate the effect between MIEs and depression (r = -.0248, p
= .0340), anxiety, (r = -.1081, p = .1554), or PTSD (r = -.0561, p = .1455). The second
hypothesis of this study was rejected.
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Figure 1
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and PTSD
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Figure 2
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and Anxiety
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Figure 3
Moderation Chart for Guilt and Shame Proneness, Moral Injury Exposure, and
Depression
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Moral Disengagement as a Moderator
Moral disengagement was hypothesized to buffer the association between morally
injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Moral disengagement did
not moderate the relationship between moral injury and depression (r = -.0052, p =
.4511), anxiety (r = -.0112, p=.0921), or PTSD (r = -.0273, p = .0629). This could be, in
part, due to a ceiling effect with a high mean response on the MIES (M = 28.6, SD =
12.4). Moral disengagement also had significant negative correlation between PTSD (r =
-.612), depression (r = -.657), and anxiety (r = -.665) and a moderate negative
correlation with moral injury (r = -.264).
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Figure 4
Moderation Chart for Moral Disengagement, Moral Injury Exposure, and PTSD
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Figure 5
Moderation Chart for Moral Injury Exposure, Moral Disengagement, and Depression
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Figure 6
Moderation Chart for Moral Injury Exposure, Moral Disengagement, and Anxiety
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between exposure to
morally injurious events and PTSD, depression, and anxiety and the role of proneness to
guilt and shame and moral disengagement as potential moderators of the relationship
between morally injurious events and psychological outcomes. The first hypothesis was
that exposure to morally injurious events would be correlated to increased reporting of
anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Supporting previous studies and theories regarding moral
injury outcomes, anxiety, depression, and PTSD were found to be positively correlated
with experiencing a morally injurious event.
Similar to Lancaster (2017), this study found a positive correlation between the
PCL-5 and MIES. Previous studies with the MIES used the previous versions of the PCL
(PCL-S, PCL-C) with a weaker correlation (Evans et al., 2017; Nash et al., 2013),
possibly indicating a stronger correlation between the current measurement of PTSD and
its relationship to exposure to MIEs.
Proneness to guilt and shame was hypothesized to be a moderator between
morally injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Proneness to guilt
and shame did not appear to moderate the relationship between moral injury exposure
and psychological outcomes, though proneness to shame and guilt was negatively
correlated to psychological outcomes. The GASP was designed to assess multiple factors.
These factors were not used for the purpose of this study, adding a limitation to its
analysis. Future research could focus specifically on a multiple factor analysis of the
relationship between proneness to shame and guilt, moral injury, and psychological
outcomes.
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Proneness to shame and guilt was not significantly correlated to any of the study
variables. Previous studies have noted the importance of state shame and guilt as a
mediator between MIEs and psychological outcomes (Litz et al., 2009), but have not
examined how traits could moderate the outcomes. This study found that preexisting
traits may not exacerbate the relationship between experiencing MIEs and psychological
outcomes, despite previous literature suggesting the moderating value of shame and guilt
after MIE exposure. This would indicate that shame and guilt results from MIE exposure.
Similarly, it would not appear that MIEs alter one’s proneness to shame and guilt for
experiences after MIEs.
Moral disengagement was hypothesized to buffer the association between morally
injurious events and anxiety, depressive, and PTSD symptoms. Moral disengagement did
not appear to moderate the relationship between moral injury and psychological
outcomes. Moral disengagement has been theorized to either enable a person to commit
an act against their moral beliefs or assist in appraisal of actions after they have already
been committed (Bandura, 2002). This study was not able to conclude if moral
disengagement was increased due to appraisal or if it was present during MIE exposure.
A dose-response effect could also explain that increased MIE exposure would limit the
effect of moral disengagement as it pertains to appraisal of MIEs.
Moral disengagement, however, had a strong relationship with each psychological
outcome, indicating that moral disengagement, in and of itself, is a protective factor
against psychological distress. Similar to previous studies (Farnsworth et al., 2014),
moral disengagement appears to bring about some reduction in distress, with moral
disengagement being negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, and PTSD. No
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previous studies, however, have been found that measured this relationship directly. This
study lends support to past research (Bandura, 2002) which found that moral
disengagement can generally reduce distress; however, it was not found to specifically
buffer the relationship between MIEs and distress.
Moral injury was also found to be negatively correlated with moral
disengagement. This could indicate alterations in belief patterns resulting from MIE
exposure or appraising experiences differently due to moral disengagement, leading to
differences in MIES responding. Evans et al. (2017) also noted that those with a higher
connection or better understanding of their moral beliefs may have higher reporting on
the MIES, which could also be the case for moral disengagement. This could mean that
those who have more of a connection with their moral beliefs appraise these beliefs more,
leading to lower reporting on moral disengagement with higher MIES reporting. No
previous studies have examined the relationship between moral injury and moral
disengagement. Future studies may look to further examine alterations in beliefs
following moral injury.
Limitations
Little research is currently available when it comes to the effects of moral injury.
Several authors have proposed theoretical models for moral injury, but few studies have
tested these models, like the one proposed by Lizt et al. (2009). This is both a strength
and limitation of this study. While this study will add empirical data to the growing body
of knowledge about moral injury, it is based on a theoretical construct that has limited
testing. An additional complication comes from the different definitions of moral injury
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confusion between action (transgressive act/morally injurious event) and reaction
(psychological outcomes like anxiety, depression, and PTSD) in moral injury.
The cross-sectional design of this study likely impacted the validity of the results.
The participants likely completed this survey with possibly a long period of time between
their last deployment (and last experience in combat) and the time of this study. It is
possible that participants may have undergone treatment that would have reduced the
psychological impact of their actions in combat. It is also likely that this period of time
could have impacted their moral disengagement because this construct has been found to
be situationally based such that individuals may be morally disengaged when they
commit the act but not in other situations or may only be morally disengaged due to the
appraisal of that specific act (Bandura, 1999). No research has tested the effects of time
on moral disengagement. Also, no study has tested the effects of time on moral injury.
This study is also limited in concluding the direction of causality for the variables, such
that the cause of PTSD, depressive, and anxiety symptoms may not be determined to
originate from the transgressive act and could actually be caused by other factors such as
general combat exposure.
PTSD is associated with problems with memory regarding the traumatic event.
Posttraumatic amnesia may cause problems with remembering the details associated to
events that may have transgressed moral beliefs. Alteration in mood, as caused by PTSD,
may also bring about thinking that could come with overreporting by those with high
PTSD scores. Likewise, alterations in worldview because of PTSD may bring about
overreporting in moral disengagement and possibly underreporting on the GASP when it
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comes to views of self, others, and the world. This may be particularly problematic with
the moral disengagement rating.
Future Directions
Future studies should examine moral disengagement and symptoms prior to
deployment as well as after deployment to examine the relationship between
experiencing the deployment and increases in moral disengagement. It is likely that this
construct could change based on experience and a cross-sectional design study may not
fully capture the effect that moral disengagement has on outcomes. Many participants in
this study scored above the threshold for PTSD on the PCL-5. Future studies should also
look at the relationship of these variables when PTSD is not present to examine moral
injury as a construct separate from PTSD.
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Appendix A
Moral Injury Event Scale (Nash et al., 2013)
Strongly Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately Strongly
Agree
Agree
Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
(6)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
1. I saw things
that were
morally wrong
2. I am troubled
by having
witnessed
others’ immoral
acts
3. I acted in
ways that
violated my
own moral code
or values
4. I am troubled
by having acted
in ways that
violated my
own morals.
5. I violated my
own morals by
failing to do
something I felt
I should have
done
6. I am troubled
because I
violated my
morals by
failing to do
something that I
felt I should
have done.
7. I felt betrayed
by leaders who I
once trusted
8. I felt betrayed
by fellow
service
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members who I
once trusted
9. I felt betrayed
by others
outside the U.S.
Military who I
once trusted
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Appendix B
PROMIS Emotional Distress – Anxiety – Short Form 8a
In the past 7 days…
I felt fearful
I found it hard to focus on anything
other than my anxiety
My worries overwhelmed me
I felt uneasy
I felt nervous
I felt like I needed help for my anxiety
I felt anxious
I felt tense

Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

56
Appendix C
PROMIS Emotional Distress – Depression – Short Form 8a
In the past 7 days…
I felt worthless
I felt helpless
I felt depressed
I felt hopeless
I felt like a failure
I felt unhappy
I felt that I had nothing to look
forward to
I felt that nothing could cheer me up

Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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Appendix D
Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al., 2011)
Very
Unlikely Slightly About Slightly Likely Very
Unlikely
(2)
Unlikely 50%
Likely
(6)
Likely
(1)
(3)
Likely
(5)
(7)
(4)
1. After realizing
you have
received too
much change at a
store, you decide
to keep it because
the salesclerk
doesn’t notice.
What is the
likelihood that
you would feel
uncomfortable
about keeping the
money?
2. You are
privately
informed that you
are the only one
in your group that
did not make the
honor society
because you
skipped too many
days of school.
What is the
likelihood that
this would lead
you to become
more responsible
about attending
school?
3. You rip an
article out of a
journal in the
library and take it
with you. Your
teacher discovers
what you did and
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tells the librarian
and your entire
class. What is the
likelihood that
this would make
you would feel
like a bad person?
4. After making a
big mistake on an
important project
at work in which
people were
depending on
you, your boss
criticizes you in
front of your
coworkers. What
is the likelihood
that you would
feign sickness
and leave work?
5. You reveal a
friend’s secret,
though your
friend never finds
out. What is the
likelihood that
your failure to
keep the secret
would lead you to
exert extra effort
to keep secrets in
the future?
6. You give a bad
presentation at
work. Afterwards
your boss tells
your coworkers it
was your fault
that your
company lost the
contract. What is
the likelihood
that you would
feel incompetent?
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7. A friend tells
you that you
boast a great deal.
What is the
likelihood that
you would stop
spending time
with that friend?
8. Your home is
very messy and
unexpected
guests knock on
your door and
invite themselves
in. What is the
likelihood that
you would avoid
the guests until
they leave?
9. You secretly
commit a felony.
What is the
likelihood that
you would feel
remorse about
breaking the law?
10. You
successfully
exaggerate your
damages in a
lawsuit. Months
later, your lies are
discovered and
you are charged
with perjury.
What is the
likelihood that
you would think
you are a
despicable human
being?
11. You strongly
defend a point of
view in a
discussion, and
though nobody
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was aware of it,
you realize that
you were wrong.
What is the
likelihood that
this would make
you think more
carefully before
you speak?
12. You take
office supplies
home for
personal use and
are caught by
your boss. What
is the likelihood
that this would
lead you to quit
your job?
13. You make a
mistake at work
and find out a
coworker is
blamed for the
error. Later, your
coworker
confronts you
about your
mistake. What is
the likelihood
that you would
feel like a
coward?
14. At a
coworker’s
housewarming
party, you spill
red wine on their
new creamcolored carpet.
You cover the
stain with a chair
so that nobody
notices your
mess. What is the
likelihood that
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you would feel
that the way you
acted was
pathetic?
15. While
discussing a
heated subject
with friends, you
suddenly realize
you are shouting
though nobody
seems to notice.
What is the
likelihood that
you would try to
act more
considerately
toward your
friends?
16. You lie to
people but they
never find out
about it. What is
the likelihood
that you would
feel terrible about
the lies you told?
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Appendix E
Moral Disengagement Scale (Jackson & Sparr, 2005)
Not True
(1)
1. In fast and clean military actions
central bases of hostile movements
can be neutralized
and collateral damage can be
minimized
2. It is irresponsible to renounce the
use of military force if a contribution
to world-peace can be made by it.
3. Terrorists are like pests in
cornfields – one has to approach them
relentlessly
4. If the NATO asks us for military
help to end a conflict in a foreign
country, I support the use of armed
forces in the crisis region
5. In the struggle for peace I find the
use of military force justified if death
of innocent people is avoided
6. If a soldier kills someone while on
duty, he acts on behalf of military
orders and thus carries no personal
responsibility for his action
7. If peaceful means cannot resolve a
conflict effectively, I support the use
of military intervention
8. If extreme political groups are
guilty of cruel crimes against
humanity and serious human rights
violations, they have not deserved to
be treated sparely

A Little
True
(2)

Middling
True
(3)

Quite
True
(4)

Very
True
(5)
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Appendix F
PTSD Checklist – for DSM-5
Not at
all (1)
1. Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted
memories of the stressful experience?
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of the stressful
experience?
3. Suddenly feeling or acting as if the stressful
experience were actually happening again (as if
you were actually back there reliving it)?
4. Feeling very upset when something reminded
you of the stressful experience?
5. Having strong physical reactions when
something reminded you of the stressful
experience (for example, heart pounding, trouble
breathing, sweating)?
6. Avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings
related to the stressful experience?
7. Avoiding external reminders of the stressful
experience (for example, people, places,
conversations, activities, objects, or situations)?
8. Trouble remembering important parts of the
stressful experience?
9. Having strong negative beliefs about yourself,
other people, or the world (for example, having
thoughts such as: I am bad, there is something
seriously wrong with me, no one can be trusted,
the world is completely dangerous)?
10. Blaming yourself or someone else for the
stressful experience or what happened after it?
11. Having strong negative feelings such as fear,
horror, anger, guilt, or shame?
12. Loss of interest in activities that you used to
enjoy?
13. Feeling distant or cut off from other people?
14. Trouble experiencing positive feelings (for
example, being unable to feel happiness or have
loving feelings for people close to you)?
15. Irritable behavior, angry outbursts, or acting
aggressively?
16. Taking too many risks or doing things that
could cause you harm?
17. Being “super alert” or watchful or on guard?
18. Feeling jumpy or easily startled?
19. Having difficulty concentrating?
20. Trouble falling or staying asleep?

A Little Modera
Bit
tely
(2)
(3)

Quite
a bit
(4)

Extremely
(5)
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Appendix G
Veteran Verification Survey (S. L. Lancaster, personal communication,
November 21, 2017)

Please answer by typing in the box or selecting the alternative option.
1. In which state is your military branch's academy located?
Option 1: Text box for them to type.
Option 2: A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran."

2. What is the acronym for the locations where final physicals are taken prior to shipping
off for basic training? (4 letters)
Option 1: Text box for them to type.
Option 2: A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran."
3. What is the acronym for the generic term the military uses for various job fields? (3/4
letters)
Option 1: Text box for them to type.
Option 2: A box they can check that says "I am not a veteran."
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Appendix H
Combat Exposure Scale (Keane et al., 1989)
Please check the number for the answer that best describes your experience.
1) Did you ever go on combat patrols or have other dangerous duty?
1
No

2
1-3 times

3
4-12 times

4
13-50 times

5
51+ times

4
4-6 months

5
7+ months

4
13-25 times

5
26+ times

2) Were you ever under enemy fire?
1
Never

2
<1 month

3
1-3 months

3) Were you ever surrounded by the enemy?
1
No

2
1-2 times

3
3-12 times

4) What percentage of the soldiers in your unit were killed (KIA), wounded or missing in
action (MIA)?
1
None

2
1-25%

3
26-50%

4
51-75%

5
76% or more

4
13-50 times

5
51+ times

5) How often did you fire rounds at the enemy?
1
No

2
1-3 times

3
4-12 times

6) How often did you see someone hit by incoming or outgoing rounds?
1
No

2
1-3 times

3
4-12 times

4
13-50 times

5
51+ times

7) How often were you in danger of being injured or killed (i.e., being pinned down,
overrun, ambushed, near miss, etc.)
1
No

2
1-3 times

3
4-12 times

4
13-50 times

5
51+ times
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Appendix I
Consent Form
This study is being done by Aaron Keating who is a student at the Illinois School of Professional
Psychology at National Louis University working on a Clinical Research Project. This study is a
requirement to fulfill the researcher’s degree and will not be used for decision-making by any organization.
The title of this study is Predictors of Distress Following Experiences in Combat. The purpose of this study
is to investigate the nature of the relationship between experiences in combat and distress and
various contributing factors in post-9/11 Combat Veterans. Up to 300 participants will be recruited
for this study. I was asked to be in this study because I am a combat veteran that served in the combat
theatre of both Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and present. If I agree to be in this study, I will be asked
to answer a survey about my military and combat experience as well as my current feelings. My
participation in this study will take between 30 and 45 minutes. The risks associated with this study are reexposure to memories associated with combat that I may consider uncomfortable, painful, or distressing. If
at any time you need to speak to a mental health professional please contact your local Veteran’s Affairs or
call the Veterans Crisis line at 1-800-273-8255 or text 838255 to speak to aa mental health professions. The
information I provide will be treated confidentially, which means that nobody except Aaron M Keating will
be able to link data to me. The records of this study will be kept private and will be retained for 3 years,
after which, the data will be deleted from all storage devices. No words linking me to the study will be
included in any sort of report that might be published. IP addresses will not be recorded. The records will
be stored securely and only Aaron M Keating and Dr. Sandra Zakowski will have access to the records. I
understand that my participation is strictly voluntary. If I do not participate, it will not harm my relationship
with Aaron Keating or Argosy University. If I decide to participate, I can refuse to answer any of the
questions that may make me uncomfortable. I can quit at any time without my relations with the university,
job, benefits, etc., being affected. I can contact Aaron Keating at aaron.m.keating@stu.argosy.edu, with any
questions about this study and may request a summary of the study’s results.
I understand that this study has been reviewed and certified by the Institutional Review Board, National
Louis University. For problems or questions regarding participants' rights, I can contact the Institutional
Review Board at the National Louis University, 122 N Michigan Ave, Chicago, IL 60603. The board is
chaired by Leah Horvath, lhorvath@nl.edu, (312) 777-7681.
I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my
satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this consent
form. By signing this document, I consent to participate in the study.
Name of Participant (printed) ____________________________________________ Date: ___________
 If you agree, click here to sign and continue to survey
Signature of Principal Investigator: ______________________
Date: __________________
Aaron M Keating
Principle Investigator
National Louis University
122 N Michigan Ave
Chicago, IL 60603
(719)360-8514
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Appendix J
Study Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in this study. This study is being done by Aaron Keating who is a
student at the Illinois School of Professional Psychology at National Louis University-Chicago
working on a Clinical Research Project. This study is a requirement to fulfill the researcher’s
degree and will not be used for decision-making by any organization.
The title of this study is Risk and Protective Factors for Psychological Distress Following a Moral
Injurious Event in Combat Veterans. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of

the relationship between experiences in combat and distress and various contributing
factors in Post-9/11 Combat Veterans. Up to 300 participants will be recruited for this study.
The risks associated with this study are re-exposure to memories associated with combat that I
may consider uncomfortable, painful, or distressing. If at any time you need to speak to a mental
health professional please contact your local Veteran’s Affairs
(https://www.va.gov/directory/guide/home.asp) or call the Veterans Crisis line at 1-800-273-8255
or text 838255 to speak to a mental health professional.
The information I provided will be treated confidentially, which means that nobody except Aaron
M Keating will be able to link data to me. The records of this study will be kept private and will
be retained for 3 years, after which, the data will be deleted from all storage devices. No words
linking me to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published. IP addresses
will not be recorded. The records will be stored securely and only Aaron M Keating and Dr.
Sandra Zakowski will have access to the records.
Please contact Aaron M Keating at akeating4@my.nl.edu, with any questions about this study
and requests for a summary of the study’s results.
Thank you again for your participation.
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Appendix K
Survey Advertisement
Are you a Veteran that has deployed to Iraq or/and Afghanistan?
Please consider filling out this survey about your combat experiences and the challenges
you may have experienced after redeployment. This study seeks to look at experiences in
combat to better understand combat experiences and their possible psychological
consequences. This survey will take between 30 and 45 minutes and your responses will
remain confidential. Your participation will contribute to our understanding of the effects
that combat has on veterans.

